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MORALITY FROM A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
Lutz H. Eckensberger 
 
 
 
1. A NOTE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
MORALITY AND CULTURE 
 
One of the many possibilities of understanding culture is proposed by Clifford 
Geertz who understood culture as “a system of control mechanisms— plans, recipes, 
rules, instructions ... that guide behavior”(Geertz, 1973). This opinion is based on the 
assumption that “man is exactly the animal that is the most dependent upon such 
control mechanisms that exist outside the skin” (p. 44). But these control mechanisms 
(rules systems) are not only “outside the skin”, they are also located in the heads of 
people. Hence, culture also represents “shared” knowledge and/or meaning systems 
which consist of theories about what a good person is (personhood), about nature, 
society and the meaning of life (religion) or its embeddedness in a transcendental sphere 
or cosmos. These rule systems are partly implicit, partly explicit. This means that 
sometimes they can be learned or reconstructed directly in the social situations, but at 
other times they are hidden and thus have to be explicated. Only humans have explicit 
rules, only humans teach them intentionally. Morality is one of these rule systems 
(control mechanisms), and it is—as we will see—a unique one. Morality is not only a 
central aspect of culture, but also unique to humans. 
Some consequences of this conception can be deduced easily: The relationship 
between culture and morality is intrinsic; morality is a constitutive feature of the culture 
concept as well as of concrete cultures; culture cannot be defined or investigated 
without heeding morality. But morality can also not be understood without reference to 
the culture concept. Secondly, cultural rules complement natural laws in explaining and 
understanding human activities (behaviors, cognition, affects). Finally and most 
important: The study of morality necessarily leads to a perspective that conceives of 
psychology as a primarily cultural science rather than as a natural science. 
 
 
2. HUMAN ACTION AS A POSSIBLE UNIVERSAL  
FOR A CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
The most challenging requirement that a cultural psychology needs to fulfil is 
overcoming the tensions between the unique and the general, and between the subject 
and the culture or context, which should both simultaneously be part of any theory 
developed in this field1. In an early analysis (Eckensberger, 1979) these requirements 
were used as criteria to evaluate existing psychological theories from a cross-cultural 
2.2 
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perspective. Without repeating these earlier arguments, the result was that only one 
theory family met these criteria. This was the family of action theories (e.g. Boesch, 
1991) based on the French tradition of Janet (Schwartz, 1951), Lewinian field theory 
(Lewin, 1951) and Russian activity theory (see Eckensberger, 1995) as well as on 
German philosophy (from Dilthey, 1894 to Habermas, 1981). Action theories make use 
of the perspective of “homo interpretans”, of humans as meaning creating and 
potentially self-reflective agencies. Action theories are not just a foundation for creating 
a culture-based psychology, they are also particularly attractive in the present context, in 
which morality is the object of theorizing and research, because the concept of morality 
analytically presupposes a decision made by a potentially self-reflective agency capable 
of deciding. Without the assumption of an agency, which can be held responsible for an 
action and its outcome, a definition of morality is hardly possible—which is why 
non-human nature is considered morally neutral. 
It is emphasized that humans are not only influenced by culture, but that they also 
create culture, and use it as a lens or medium to understand the world, as a means of 
coping with it instrumentally and socially. In addition a common deep structure is 
assumed to be fundamental to this entire dialectical process linking the agency and 
culture. The model postulates that every human being as an agency is capable of 
reflective processes and that actions can be differentiated analytically at three levels. At 
the first level of primary actions all humans develop goals (intentionality), choose 
means and evaluate the processes resulting from interacting with the material 
environment (instrumental actions) or with others (communicative actions), thereby 
creating their understanding of the world during ontogeny (for a detailed explication see 
Eckensberger, 1990, 1995, 2002). Within the person schemata about the world are 
constructed, and in the environment material and social consequences of actions are 
produced, thereby forming the enabling and constraining conditions for further actions. 
These schemata are shaped by experiences gained in different material, social and 
symbolic contexts, like exclusively child-oriented activities in the West or within 
co-occurring care structures in some non-western cultures (Keller & Eckensberger, 
1998), yet both can be formulated within the same action theory framework. If action 
barriers occur at this level, action controls or regulations are developed. Since they are 
structurally also actions, they are called action-oriented or secondary actions. These 
secondary actions lead to the development of control beliefs and normative 
frameworks in the person (agency), and to control myths, conventions and laws within 
the culture. They define constraints or support for further actions. Finally, the barriers 
during action regulations lead to third order actions which are agency oriented. 
Basically these are reflective processes that are applied to actions and action 
regulations, to the agency him- or herself (self-reflection), as well as to the very 
existence of the agency (contemplation). 
Although the action levels are formed in this basic sequence (the older one gets, 
the more these levels are simultaneously active), all levels are necessary to understand a 
human action: In order to understand a simple act, like writing this chapter, one has to 
know my immediate intentions (to make my point within the time span of the deadline 
given), but also the standards or conventions, in which the chapter has to be written 
(length, APA format), as well as the fact that I am aware of deviating from some other 
theoretical positions held. In addition, this may be essential for my self-identity as a 
cultural psychologist, etc. 
This framework serves as an analytical tool, insofar as it allows for the integration 
of psychological and cultural constructs, for instance, defining morality and 
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distinguishing different domains of social cognition and – quite generally enables the 
integration of many psychological concepts (cognitions, affects, control beliefs, self 
construal, etc.).  
Apart from this action theory also serves as an empirical tool because it guides the 
process of data gathering (course of actions/interactions), the strategy of data analysis 
(utterances/interpretations) and of course the interpretation. 
 
 
3. APPLICATION OF AN ACTION THEORY FRAMEWORK TO 
INTERPRETATIONS OF DATA AND DISCUSSIONS OF  
MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN CULTURAL CONTEXT 
 
Our research originally started with Kohlberg’s theory on the development of 
moral judgment, which clearly is the most influential theory in this field, not only in 
developmental psychology, but also in cross-cultural research (cf. Eckensberger & 
Zimba, 1997).  
We applied the action theory model to morality and its development in context. 
The results are manifold and promising. First, we reconstructed moral development by 
using the action elements as a criterion for the structure of moral reasoning and 
justification (goal taking instead of role taking). This procedure resulted in stages that 
with increasing age involve increases in the kind and number of action elements 
considered in a moral decision. This analysis ended up with more stages (eleven) than 
Kohlberg proposed (Eckensberger & Reinshagen, 1980, Eckensberger, 1986), and in 
four instead of three levels of moral judgment. These are generated in two “social 
interpretation spheres”, the interpersonal sphere, defined by concrete interactions with 
concrete persons, and the transpersonal social sphere, determined by functions and 
roles. According to our data and theoretical analysis, development proceeds from 
heteronomy to autonomy within both levels (Eckensberger, Döring & Breit, 2001). It is 
important, however, that heteronomy is quite generally defined as the realm of 
necessities, that is, by external and internal constraints, and not as narrowly as in the 
Piagetian tradition by external constraints only. Second, heteronomy at the 
transpersonal level also comprises autonomy and heteronomy at the interpersonal level. 
The ideal in this case, however, is truth and objectivity, which partly involves 
necessities, but at the same time is also of benefit to all.  
From a bird's eye view, a considerable amount of support for Kohlberg's central 
claims exists in cross-cultural research (that the development of moral judgments is 
universal, that no stage regressions and no stage skipping occurs). However, there are 
also serious doubts whether this theory really captures the ethical concepts of other 
cultures. Some arguments are formulated top down (using moral principles) and others 
bottom up (using empirical data) (cf. Eckensberger & Zimba, 1997, for details). Some 
will be dealt with in the following, and they will be dealt with in an action theory 
context. They are discussed predominantly at the second and third level of actions. 
 
 
3.1. The centrality of agency 
 
One can argue that without a self-reflective agency religions would not exist. This 
view implies that religion is an effort of humans to deal with the inevitability of death 
(Eckensberger, 1993). This applies to the religiosity of the individual person as well as 
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the institution of religion which is considered the cradle of culture (Morin, 1973). All 
religions commonly also fulfill much broader functions: They provide ideas about the 
ontology of earth and heaven/cosmos (e.g. genesis in the Bible) and, most important in 
the present context, they organize life on earth by formulating rules of conduct like the 
Ten Commandments. Hence religions are basically similar to ethics. In some 
religions/cultures this is also true for law as, for example, in China and Islam (Ma, 
1998; Haque, 2002). But in the West, morality and religion were separated during the 
Enlightenment (at least at the level of theology and philosophy). For this reason agency 
is of the utmost importance for defining autonomy and responsibility in Western 
morality, as both form the basis of a deontic intrinsic morality, which is not derived 
from any transcendental power or religious structure. But in many non-western cultures 
no separation of religion and morality (sometimes also law) occurred during history. 
Thus the existential dimension of the agency is underlined in all rules of conduct. 
Huebner and Garrod (1991), for instance, pointed out that in Hindu and Buddhist 
cultures morality is embedded in conceptions about the very nature of human existence 
itself. Vasudev (1986) elaborates that in Hinduism morality and religion are 
inseparable. In particular the law of karma (i.e., adding up of good [dharma] and bad 
[adharma] actions that may also have been committed in earlier lives) is regarded as 
crucial. This leads, of course, to types of moral reasoning totally different from the 
ones defined in Kohlberg’s stage theory and manual, but this does not mean that they 
are not structurally equivalent. All in all these examples indicate that the concept of 
agency, which is basic to all action theories, is essential for prescriptive norms or 
principles. 
 
 
3.2. Morality as a prescriptive standard for human actions: Duties 
 
In several contexts it is claimed that Western ethics is primarily rights based, while 
non-western ethics is duty based. For example, the Japanese (Confucian) principle of 
giri-ninjo (obligation) is referred to, which seems quite similar to the Indian ethic of 
duty dharma (obligations to others and one self; Miller, 1994; Shweder, Mahapatra & 
Miller, 1987).  
The impression that Western ethics is rights based, may have been conveyed by the 
dichotomy of individualism-collectivism, which often seems to imply that individualism 
is based upon individual rights, or even on egoism. This is misleading however: Kant 
(1968/1788) distinguished between “acting dutifully” and “acting because of a sense of 
duty”, i.e, out of a moral obligation, which basically means to act autonomously. In this 
sense non-western cultures are also autonomous, which implies that individualism is not 
the same as autonomy (Kagitcibasi, 1996). Thus regardless of the exact structures of 
these duty concepts, they are all based on an agency as a necessary precondition. 
 
3.2.1. Duty to develop the agency 
Self-development is itself considered a mandatory obligation. In India this is one 
function of education (Clemens, 2004). In Hinduism and Buddhism self-cultivation as a 
goal is even considered ultimately to “free” the self from the self (Hinduism: the 
universal Atman; in Buddhism: the Nirvana), which is also a solution of the fear of 
death, but a very “radical” one. This faith is, however, also only understandable through 
action theory, because it is reached by contemplation, which is a self-oriented action. 
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3.2.2. Duty to maintain harmony 
Durganand Sinha (1996) confronted the Western concept of control (as secondary 
actions or control ideals at the third level) with the Eastern concept of harmony as an 
ideal. This idea applies to man/man-relations as well as to man/nature-relations in 
Hinduism. In Indonesia the ideal of rukun means social harmony, but also harmony 
between youths/elders (Setiono, 1994). Similarly in China the Confucian concept of Yin 
and Yang relates to the balance between man/man, man/women and man/nature. There 
are also explicit conflict solving strategies in China that aim at “harmony maintenance” 
(Hwang, 1998). These imply “taking care of face” (vertical in-group), “giving face” 
(horizontal in-group) and “striving for face” (horizontal out-group). These are 
regulatory strategies that are not explicit in the West, and they all serve the goal of 
maintaining harmony. The ideas of harmony certainly guide action, yet they are often 
not based on equality (justice), but rather on equity.  
Like justice equality is based on respect. Respect is, however, distributed 
unequally. This is true for respecting older persons (hormat) in Indonesia, and filial 
piety in Confucian cultures. In India justice is generally understood as what one 
deserves. But “deservingness” varies depending on a variety of aspects: Kinship (eldest 
son deserves most), Varna (Cast – Brahmins deserve most), gender (men deserve 
more). Equality thus only exists, when all other factors have been considered (Krishnan, 
1997). Respect, however, may even be extended beyond other persons in the society. 
Vasudev (1986), for instance, elaborates the Indian principle of respect for all life, 
leading to the principle of non-violence (ahimsa) in Hinduism. 
Emotions, as important processes in action evaluation and regulation, like shame 
and guilt, can also vary in different cultures. Shame, for instance, may be experienced in 
China after moral transgressions that usually elicit guilt in the West (Bedford, 2004). 
They both derive from considering oneself as agency to be responsible for actions, 
however, in cultures that produce “interrelated agencies” or “extended agencies” (the 
term I prefer) others are also an integral part of agency, and have to be considered in 
keeping balance or harmony. Even though shame is evoked in this cultural context, the 
basic function of emotions as regulators of actions remains the same. Emotions are just 
embedded in different meaning systems, and this is what action theory takes into 
account. 
 
 
3.3. The embeddedness of the agency in the cultural context 
 
Probably the most salient feature of recent cross-cultural literature is the greater 
visibility of the social context into which agency is embedded in non-western cultures, 
which, as we saw, also leads to somewhat different mandatory standards or ethical 
principles. Similar to the interdependent self-construal identified in Japan (Markus & 
Kitayama, 1991) several other conceptions of the self as part of different social realities 
exist. Often a private and a public self are distinguished: In Hinduism an individual role 
(samanya dharma) and societal role (varnaashram dharma) has to be taken. In Hong 
Kong, China a small and a big “I” are distinguished (Ma, 1998). In Japan the 
dichotomy tatamae (one's natural, real, or inner wishes) and honne (standards by which 
one is bound outwardly) exists (Lebra, 1976). 
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3.4. Interpersonal and transpersonal social spheres 
 
Several arguments and data in cross-cultural research indicate that the universality 
of the transition from stage three to four in the Kohlbergian scheme is doubtful. Setiono 
(1994), for instance, claims that the Javanese concepts of hormat and rukun resemble 
Kohlberg’s stage three, but that Javanese people actually show a local adaptation, in 
that they already reach an optimal moral development at stage three. Thus Setiono 
(1994) calls these concepts moral principles. Ma (1998), on the other hand, 
reconstructs indigenous Chinese stages of moral thinking by first defining “a general or 
master structure”, which underlie both Western and Chinese sub-structures. The latter 
is based on the Chinese (Confucian) principle of jen (love, benevolence, 
human-heartedness, man-to-manness, sympathy, perfect virtue), which leads to the 
norm of filial piety and social altruism, social order and the norm of propriety. 
However, the indigenous stages are only proposed for stages four and higher: stages 
one to three (!) are assumed to be identical to those in the West. Hence sometimes 
benevolence is interpreted as stage three and sometimes as a moral principle. This 
tension may be overcome by distinguishing the two levels of social spheres 
(interpersonal and transpersonal) mentioned above. This can be demonstrated most 
clearly with respect to the different conceptualizations of “we-ness” in other cultures. 
In Indonesian Kita and Kami refer to “we-ness” at different “levels” of social reality 
(Hassan, 2002): The Kami-mode refers precisely to the level of “interpersonal 
relations” and groups based on empathy and reciprocal respect, also implying 
discrimination and exclusion of others; the Kita-mode, however, refers to the 
“transpersonal level” of moral thinking (Eckensberger, Döring & Breit, 2001), which 
implies commonality with others oriented towards basic human virtues and principles 
that are true for all of humankind and not just for a particular culture.  
 
 
3.5. Norms and facts 
 
Action theory is particularly helpful in research on the domain specificity of social 
cognition. In this field moral conventions and morality (Turiel, 1983) are differentiated 
by their functionality. Whether a specific situation is interpreted as representing 
conventions or morality, is determined by how the facts are interpreted through the eyes 
of the beholder,. Action theory is helpful in explaining this, because norms and facts are 
systematically interrelated in a single act. The means of acting are related to the goals 
by final (in order to) reasoning, whereas the consequences in instrumental actions 
follow causally from having performed them. Therefore, the assumption or knowledge 
of causal processes (facts) also influences the moral interpretation of a situation as an 
example taken from Africa (Zimba, 1994) may serve to show. The Chewa and Tumbuka 
of Zambia distinguish sexually “hot” individuals (teenagers and adults of child-bearing 
age) from sexually “cold” ones (infants, seriously sick persons, neophytes in the rites of 
passage, and adults who there are no longer sexually active). They also believe that 
engaging in chigololo, that is, premarital sex by “hot” individuals, causes (!) illness 
amongst the “cold” moral patients. Chigololo pollutes sexually “hot” individuals and 
makes them transmit the pollution to sexually “cold” individuals through fire, touch, 
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salt and air. Consequently they interpret premarital sex as a “moral” issue, as opposed to 
American university students who understand such activity as either a personal issue or 
as a convention. 
The “causal chain” of harm, which the Chewa and Tumbuka perceive, is not shared 
at a universal level. Yet, it demonstrates that protecting moral patients from harm, 
regardless of how this is conceived in a specific context, can take different forms, 
conceptualizations and characteristics. Actions that do not protect moral patients from 
harm are morally wrong in principle, whether local or universal, whether allowed or 
forbidden. Harming is harming, also in an African context. 
 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARK 
 
It might look as though cultural psychology as a perspective (or paradigm) and 
action theory as its preferred theoretical framework are just a lens through which one 
can look at various empirical data in psychology. But this would be a misunderstanding. 
It is a way of looking at the world, but not at given data, because data (their gathering as 
well as their interpretation) already depend upon the perspective taken (Eckensberger & 
Burgard, 1983). Even though I used examples from existing literature, they were all 
based on qualitative research methods to allow me to make my contextual 
interpretations; this would have been more difficult with quantitative data.  
The perspective we propose is not just relevant to cross-cultural research, but for 
psychology in general. Culture is central for and unique to humans, and therefore a 
psychology that claims to deal with humans cannot do without it. It is as simple as that. 
Culture in this perspective is not an independent variable, but an integral part of 
psychological processes and structures. It defines the meaning of what and how we 
think, feel and behave. Therefore psychology cannot do without culture and its meaning 
systems. This implies that we have to develop theories, which take into account the 
differences of meaning in different cultures and the underlying deep structure of 
meaning in culture. Action theory can serve as a step in this direction. But this has many 
methodical implications (Eckensberger & Burgard, 1983). Their detailed treatment is 
beyond the scope of this contribution, but they will certainly involve a more taken for 
granted application of qualitative methods. At present the use of qualitative methods has 
to be justified in every case. Quantitative approaches represent the normal, conventional 
tools. If we focus on the concept of meaning as the core of psychology, then this 
treatment of the two approaches may even be reversed in the long run. In any case, 
complementing the nomothetic by a cultural perspective in psychology would in the 
long run also imply the necessity to specify arguments supporting the use of quantitative 
methods.  
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